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Abstract
In this paper, we examine how the structure of an imperfectly com-
petitive input market aﬀects ﬁnal-good producers’ incentives to form a
Research Joint Venture (RJV), in a diﬀerentiated duopoly where R&D in-
vestments exhibit spillovers. Although a RJV is always proﬁtable, down-
stream ﬁrms’ incentives for R&D cooperation are non-monotone in the
structure of the input market, with incentives being stronger under a mo-
nopolistic input supplier, whenever spillovers are low. In contrast to the
hold-up argument, we also ﬁnd that under non-cooperative R&D invest-
ments and weak free-riding, ﬁnal-good producers invest more when facing
a monopolistic input supplier, compared with investments under compet-
ing vertical chains. Integrated innovation and competition policies are
also discussed.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The critical role of innovation on the competitiveness of ﬁrms, industries and
national economies has by far been established by academics and recognized
by policy-makers. However, Research and Development (R&D hereafter) ac-
tivities generate knowledge spillovers that may lead to free-riding and underin-
vestment.1 In order to overcome these weaknesses, policy-makers and business
practitioners moved towards new organizational forms of R&D investments. As
Vonortas (1997) notes, Research Joint Ventures (RJV hereafter) were regarded
as “the cure for a number of failures in innovation markets” as far as knowl-
edge spillovers are internalized and thus incentives for R&D investments are
restored.2
The economic literature in the ﬁeld of RJVs has mainly been inspired by
the seminal papers of d’ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al.
(1992) that have been generalized and extended towards several directions.3
Caloghirou Ioannides and Vonortas (2003), surveying a great volume of available
theory and empirical evidence, conclude on some robust incentives for ﬁrms to
participate in RJVs: Internalizing R&D spillovers, sharing the cost and avoiding
the duplication of R&D activities, having access to complementary resources
and skills, exploiting economies of scale and scope, distributing the investment
risk to more investors, creating new investment options and promoting technical
standards are strong incentives that lead to R&D cooperation.4
1D’ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) mention that “R&D externalities or spillovers imply
that some beneﬁts of each ﬁrm’s R&D ﬂow without compensation to other ﬁrms and this may
cause free-riding behavior and underinvestment problems”.
2Recent papers establish the growing trend of RJVs. Caloghirou Ioannides and Vonor-
tas (2003), exploring the existing databases (MERIT-CATI, NCRA-RJV, CORE, STEP TO
RJV), demonstrate that the number of the new world-wide partnerships set up annually in-
creased from about 30-40 in the early seventies to 100-200 in the late seventies. Starting from
around 200 per year, the number of new partnerships announced every year reached around
600 or more in the eighties and nineties. Most partnerships are established between multina-
tional ﬁrms from OECD countries and high-tech industries. Hagedoorn and van Kranenburg
(2003), exploring the MERIT-CATI databank for the period 1960-1998, conﬁrm a growth
pattern in RJVs. Focusing on the EU case, Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) mention that
1031 RJVs were sponsored under the EUREKA project over the 1985-1996 period and 3874
RJVs were ﬁnanced under the 3rd and 4th Framework Programs for Science and Technology
(FPST) over the 1992-1996 period.
3The papers of Suzumura (1992), Ziss (1994), Poyago-Theotoky (1995), Salant and Shaﬀer
(1998) and Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) have contributed much in the literature. More recent
contributions contain the papers of Yi and Shin (2000), Cabral (2002), Miyagiwa and Ohno
(2002), Lambertini et al. (2002) and Amir et al. (2003).
4The empirical literature for RJVs is growing too. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), us-
ing data from the Community Innovation Survey for the Belgian manufacturing industry in
1993, ﬁnd that although cost-sharing is an important incentive for cooperation, risk-sharing
is not. They also ﬁnd that the probability of cooperation increases in the size of the ﬁrms and
when incoming spillovers are high while outgoing spillovers are low. Benfratello and Sembenelli
(2002), ﬁnd that ﬁrms participating in the EUREKA program over the 1985—1996 period have
experienced a signiﬁcant improvement in their “adjusted” performance measures between the
“pre” and the “post” period. Labor productivity and price cost margins for participating
ﬁrms show a lower than average in the pre-period but a higher than average performance in
the post-period. Hernan et al. (2003), ﬁnd that the probability of forming a RJV, under
2Although the research on RJVs is growing, formal models have focused on
horizontal settings, assuming that the ﬁrms that form a RJV buy their inputs
from perfectly competitive input markets. The purpose of this paper is to in-
vestigate the eﬀects of an imperfectly competitive input market where input
suppliers do have market power and extract rents. Regarding a two-tier mar-
ket structure, where downstream ﬁrms, that undertake R&D investments, buy
inputs from input suppliers that capture mark-up rents, issues from the “hold-
up” literature have to be taken into account.5 In this setting, cost-reducing
innovations by downstream ﬁrms increase the demand for the ﬁnal good and
subsequently, the demand for the inputs sold by suppliers also increases. Thus,
suppliers increase the price that they charge and the stronger the suppliers’ mar-
ket power, the higher the rents that they capture and the lower the downstream
ﬁrms’ proﬁts and returns on R&D investments. Downstream ﬁrms know this ex
ante and as a result they invest low amounts in R&D.
In this vertical framework, we address the following questions: Firstly, “how
does the structure of the input market aﬀect downstreams’ incentives to form a
RJV?” and secondly, “how does the coexistence of R&D spillovers and suppliers’
rent-extracting aﬀect downstreams’ amounts invested in case of non-cooperative
and cooperative R&D investments?”
In order to answer these questions, we consider a two-tier market structure
consisting of two downstream ﬁrms - ﬁnal-good producers while the upstream
industry can be either duopolistic or monopolistic. For the duopolistic case, we
follow the competing vertical chains regime, where each downstream ﬁrm has an
exclusive relationship with one of the two upstream ﬁrms. In the monopolistic
case, there is a common input supplier for both downstream ﬁrms. Downstream
ﬁrms, endowed with symmetric technologies, produce a diﬀerentiated ﬁnal-good
and invest in R&D for cost-reducing process innovations. Firms may invest
either non-cooperatively, or by forming a RJV, while R&D activities exhibit
spillovers.
The present paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First of all,
it is found that downstream ﬁrms’ incentives to form a RJV are non-monotone
in the structure of the input market. Although a RJV is always proﬁt-enhancing
the EUREKA and EU Framework Programmes, is inﬂuenced positively by sectoral R&D in-
tensity, industry concentration, ﬁrm size, technological spillovers and past RJV participation.
Caloghirou, Hondroyiannis and Vonortas (2003), investigating data from the STEP TO RJVs
databank, suggest that partnership success depends signiﬁcantly on the closeness of the co-
operative research to the in-house R&D eﬀort of the ﬁrm, on the ﬁrm’s eﬀort to learn from
the partnership and its partners and on the absence of problems of knowledge appropriation
between partners. Moreover, they ﬁnd that ﬁrms use partnerships as vehicles of risk and un-
certainty reduction by collaborating with competitors and suppliers. Finally, Belderbos et al.
(2004), using data from the Community Innovation Survey for the Netherlands during 1996-
1998, examine the determinants of innovating ﬁrms’ decisions to establish cooperation with
competitors (horizontal), suppliers or customers (vertical) and with universities and research
institutes (institutional cooperation). They ﬁnd that incoming spillovers from universities and
research institutes stimulate cooperation of all types. Risk, organizational constraints in the
ﬁrm’s innovation process and ﬁrm size have a positive impact on all four types of cooperation,
while R&D intensity has a positive impact on vertical and institutional cooperation.
5See Banerjee and Lin (2003) and the references therein.
3for downstream ﬁrms, whether the input supplier(s) extract(s) rents from the
downstream ﬁrms depends on the structure of the input market, the degree
of spillovers that are internalized under the RJV and the degree of product
diﬀerentiation. Whenever internalized spillovers are low, the eﬃciency of the
RJV is fully exploited by the ﬁnal-good producers and no eﬃciency is transferred
to the upstream market, only if downstream ﬁrms face a monopolistic input
supplier. Thus, downstreams’ incentives for a RJV are stronger in case of a single
supplier, compared with incentives under competing vertical chains. Whenever
internalized spillovers are high, the single supplier captures higher rents than
suppliers under competing vertical chains do and thus, incentives for a RJV are
stronger in case of competing vertical chains. The analysis also reveals that
the more homogeneous the products are, the higher the spillovers that must
be internalized under the RJV in order incentives under a single supplier to be
stronger than incentives under a duopolistic input market.
In the second part of the paper we restrict our attention on the amounts
invested in R&D. The present paper is among the ﬁrst in the theoretical R&D
literature that incorporates R&D spillovers into a vertical setting. In contrast
to the hold-up argument, the analysis reveals that whenever ﬁrms invest non-
cooperatively, investments are higher under a monopolistic supplier, compared
with investments under competing vertical chains, if the free-riding is not in-
tense. We argue that it is the combination of the low spillovers, that favor, and
the single supplier’s strong pressure, that forces, downstream ﬁrms to increase
R&D investments. This result contradicts with the conventional argument,
which indicates that, the stronger the rent-extracting that downstream ﬁrms
face, the lower the amounts that they invest per se. In case of a RJV, invest-
ments are higher under competing vertical chains. In this case, downstreams
invest cooperatively, avoid the free-riding and internalize the spillovers. As a
result, there is no strategic interactions between ﬁrms in the investments stage.
As far as a single supplier always extracts a higher input price it discourages
downstreams’ R&D investments. We argue that the eﬀect of the input market
structure on R&D investments depends on whether spillovers lead to free-riding
or being internalized. We also ﬁnd that the critical spillover rate increases as
products become more homogeneous, indicating that the ﬁercer the competition
becomes, the higher the spillovers that ﬁrms must internalize in order the RJV
to be investment enhancing.
The welfare analysis suggests that a single supplier depresses social welfare
under both non-cooperative and cooperative R&D investments. In addition to
that, the minimum internalized spillovers in order the regulator to approve the
RJV are lower under the competing vertical chains regime, compared with the
single supplier regime, for every degree of product diﬀerentiation. These results
underline that a single supplier hinders the transfer of the eﬃciency created by a
RJV to consumers. Existing literature on RJVs, assuming perfectly competitive
input markets, suggests that if spillovers exceed a critical level, a RJV results
in enhanced social welfare and thus, cooperation will be preferable from the
regulator’s point of view. This paper contributes to the relevant literature as
we prove that the regulator, when deciding to approve or not the formation
4of a RJV, should also take into account the structure of the input market.
Policy-implications contain the encouragement of RJVs and the institution of
antitrust enforcement for the input markets of R&D intensive industries. This
combination of innovation and competition policies leads to the more preferable
outcomes in terms of social welfare.
We are aware of two papers that study downstream ﬁrms R&D investments
in two-tier vertically related industries. However, the questions addressed in
these papers diﬀer from ours. Attalah (2002) considers two vertically related
duopolistic industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and verti-
cal spillovers between the two industries. All ﬁrms can engage in cost-reducing
R&D activities. In the ﬁrst stage of the game all ﬁrms decide on their R&D
simultaneously, while in the second and the third stage, suppliers and ﬁnal-
good producers compete in quantities respectively. He studies four diﬀerent
schemes of R&D investments: No cooperation, intraindustry cooperation only,
interindustry cooperation only and simultaneous interindustry and intraindustry
cooperation. Cooperative settings are compared in terms of R&D solely. The
comparison shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others, while the
type of cooperation that yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical
spillovers, and market structure.6 Although we examine the case of horizon-
tal cooperation solely, the present paper departs from Attalah (2002) and Ishii
(2004) in several ways. First of all, they examine only the case of an upstream
duopoly, while in the present paper, the case of a single supplier is also exam-
ined. Thus, we gauge the antitrust issues of diﬀerent input market structures.
In addition to that, Attalah (2002) and Ishii (2004) consider that input suppliers
compete in input quantities. However, in our model suppliers set input prices.
By doing so, the eﬀects of supplier rent-extracting behavior is also taken into
account. Thirdly, both of the above papers focus on R&D investments, while
no attention is given in ﬁrms’ incentives to cooperate between diﬀerent types of
organization modes of R&D.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the
model and in sections 3 we examine ﬁnal-good producers’ incentives to form a
RJV. In section 4 the attention is restricted on R&D investment levels and in
section 5 we carry out a welfare analysis and present policy implications. In
section 6 some extensions of the basic model are discussed and ﬁnally, section 7
concludes.
6In an identical setup and sequence of decisions, Ishii (2004) extends the analysis of Attalah.
Ishii (2004), following the taxonomy of Kamien et al. (1992), considers input R&D spillovers
rather than output spillovers considered by Attalah (2002). He compares R&D investments
under four vertical R&D organization modes: Non-cooperative R&D, vertical R&D cartels,
vertical non-cooperative RJVs, and vertical RJV cartels. He ﬁnds that vertical R&D cartels
attain a higher technological improvement and a larger social welfare than non-cooperative
R&D and that vertical R&D cartels yield a larger social welfare than horizontal R&D cartels
if the horizontal spillover rate between upstream ﬁr m si sn o ts u ﬃciently high.
52 The model
We consider a two-tier industry. There are two downstream ﬁrms, ﬁnal-good
producers, while the input market can be either duopolistic or monopolistic.
The structure of the input market is assumed to be exogenously given. In case
of a duopolistic input market, we follow the competing vertical chains regime
(CV):E a c hd o w n s t r e a mﬁrm has an exclusive relationship with one of the two
upstream ﬁrms and buys its input only from that particular upstream ﬁrm. In
the monopolistic case, there is a single supplier (S) for both downstream ﬁrms.
We also assume that the production cost for the supplier(s) is normalized to
zero and that supplier(s) unilaterally set(s) the price w o ft h ei n p u tt h a ti ss o l d
to ﬁnal-good producers.7
Each downstream ﬁrm, denoted by i,j =1 ,2,i 6= j,p r o d u c e sad i ﬀerenti-
ated ﬁnal good (goods 1 and 2 respectively) and the inverse demand for that
good is linear: Pi = α − qi − γqj. The parameter γ ∈ [0,1] is a measure of
substitutability in demand. If γ → 0 the goods are regarded as (almost) unre-
lated, whereas γ → 1 corresponds to the case of (almost) homogeneous goods.
Each downstream ﬁrm produces its ﬁnal-good with a ﬁxed-coeﬃcient technol-
ogy -one unit of ﬁnal product requires exactly one unit of the input- and the
marginal cost of transforming the input into the ﬁnal-good is c.W e f u r t h e r
consider that ﬁrm i can invest in R&D for cost-reducing process innovations.
The overall marginal cost of transforming inputs into the ﬁnal-good is given by
wi +c−yi −δyj. yi is the cost reduction due to ﬁrm i’s R&D investment, while
yj is the beneﬁts that leak from ﬁrm j to ﬁrm i without compensation, due
to the spillovers of R&D activities. δ is the spillover rate, indicating the R&D
externalities, with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Following d’ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988),
we assume that spillovers are exogenous and industry-wide. The cost of R&D is
1
2ky2
i,r e ﬂecting the existence of diminishing returns to R&D expenditures. Pa-
rameter k captures the relative eﬀectiveness of R&D.8 Thus, downstream ﬁrm
i has a total cost function, Ci =( wi + c − yi − δyj)qi − 1
2y2
i ,i,j=1 ,2,i6= j.
We consider that in this industry, R&D can be carried out under two alter-
native organizational forms:
I. Non-cooperatively, where downstream ﬁrms carry out their R&D activities
strategically. Formally speaking, ﬁrms act non-cooperatively in both R&D and
output stage.
I I .C o o p e r a t i v e l y ,w h e r et h ed o w n s t r e a mﬁrms form a RJV and each enjoys
the common R&D output. In this case, ﬁrms coordinate their activities so
as to maximize their joint proﬁts in the R&D stage. Under a RJV, although
ﬁrms internalize spillovers and avoid free-riding, duplication of eﬀort is not
eliminated.9
In order to answer the questions addressed above, we consider a four stage
game with the following timing:
7In section 6.2 we allow for bargaining over the input price.
8k ≥ 1 guarantees that the second order conditions are satisﬁed. For simplicity, we assume
that k =1 .
9In section 6.3 we examine the case where ﬁrms invest cooperatively in one common lab.
6Stage 1: Downstream ﬁrms decide simultaneously, whether to invest in
R&D non-cooperatively (nc) or to form a RJV (c).
Stage 2: Downstream ﬁrms invest in R&D.
Stage 3: Upstream ﬁrm(s) set(s) input price.
Stage 4: Downstream ﬁrms set quantities of the ﬁnal-good.
We solve the game using Backwards Induction, in order to deﬁne the Sub-
game Nash Perfect Equilibrium (SPNE).
3I n c e n t i v e s t o f o r m a R e s e a r c h J o i n t V e n t u r e 10
3.1 The case of Competing Vertical Chains
We begin our analysis by examining the case where downstream ﬁrms invest
in R&D non-cooperatively (denoted by nc). 11 In the last stage of the game,
downstreams compete in a Cournot fashion, so as to maximize their proﬁts:









[(2 − γ)(a − c) − 2wi + γwj + yi (2 − γδ)+yj (2δ − γ)]
4 − γ2 (2)
q∗
i decreases in wi and increases in wj.N o t ea l s ot h a tq∗
i increases not only
with ﬁrm i’s R&D investment but with ﬁrm j’s as well, indicating the positive
spillover eﬀect of R&D on the ﬁnal-good quantity. For γ ∈ [0,1] and δ ∈ [0,1],
ﬁrm i’s R&D investment has larger impact on its output than j’s R&D impact
has, as 2 − γδ > 2δ − γ always holds. In the case of perfect spillovers (δ =1 ),
ﬁrm i’s and j’s R&D investments have equal impact on each ﬁrm’s output.
Given q∗
i and q∗
j, in the third stage of the game input suppliers set input




Thus, each supplier charges an input price equal to:
wi =
£¡












10Our benchmark is the paper of d’ Aspremond and Jacquemin (1988), who consider a
perfectly competitive input market. In this benchmark case, they ﬁnd that a RJV increases
investments if δ>0.5, while it is always proﬁtable for downstream ﬁrms, regardless the
magnitude of spillovers.
11This can be the case where an antitrust law forbids the formation of RJVs among com-
petitors in order to deter a possible cartel in the market of the ﬁnal good.
12We assume that c ≤ a.
7In the second stage of the game, downstream ﬁrms set non-cooperatively
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Qualitative analysis of the results in equilibrium indicates that, as far as
downstream ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively and spillovers lead to free-riding,
















dδ > 0), because increases in the spillovers that
leak from ﬁrm j to ﬁrm i,d e c r e a s ei’s marginal cost. Finally, downstream
and input suppliers’ proﬁts decrease in the degree of product diﬀerentiation ³
dΠCV
inc





, because the more homogeneous that products are,
the ﬁercer the competition, and as a result, ﬁnal-good producers’ and input
suppliers’ proﬁts decrease.
Let us now examine the case where downstream ﬁrms form a RJV under
competing vertical chains. In the last stage of the game, output is given by eq.
(2) and in the third stage input suppliers charge a price given by eq. (4). In
the second stage of the game downstream ﬁrms invest cooperatively in R&D so
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32γ − 12γ2 − 4γ3 + γ4 − 8
¡
7+2 δ + δ
2¢ (12)
We set A2 =3 2 γ − 12γ2 − 4γ3 + γ4 − 8
¡
−7+2 δ + δ
2¢
and it is found that
results in equilibrium are given by:
Y CV
c =





























R&D investments, total output, upstream and downstream proﬁts increase
in δ, as far as spillovers are internalized. Moreover, the comparative positive
eﬀect of spillovers on upstream and downstream proﬁts in the case of a RJV
is higher than the corresponding negative in case of strategic investments, due





















always hold). Results for the role of γ are identical with the corresponding in
the non-cooperative case.
Now, consider that the formation of a RJVs is permitted. Do ﬁnal-good
producers have incentives (ICV) to form a RJV under competing vertical chains?
T h u s ,w ei n v e s t i g a t ed o w n s t r e a mﬁrms’ strategies in the ﬁrst stage of the game
and we answer the ﬁrst question addressed in the introduction of this paper.
Downstream ﬁrm i h a si n c e n t i v e st oc o o p e r a t ei nR & Dw i t hﬁrm j if each
ﬁrm’s proﬁts under the RJV are higher than proﬁts under non-cooperation
(ICV = ΠCV
ic − ΠCV
inc > 0).W es t a t eo u rﬁndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (i)Downstream ﬁrms have incentives to form a RJV under com-
peting vertical chains. (ii) R&D investments, input price, upstream proﬁts and
9ﬁnal-good quantities are higher under a RJV, if δ>b δCV (γ) with
db δCV (γ)
dγ > 0
and b δCV (0) = 0 (b δCV (1) = 0.29).





















dδ > 0,w h i l e
dyCV
inc
dδ < 0 and as a result, decreases in marginal cost under
a RJV are higher than the corresponding decreases in case of non-cooperation.
We further ﬁnd that R&D investments are higher under a RJV, if spillovers
exceed a critical rate (δCV). In case of non-cooperation, free-riding discourages
ﬁrms to invest in R&D and
dyCV
inc
dδ < 0. On the contrary, by forming a RJV, ﬁrms







Results for investments are presented in ﬁgure 1a. Note that δCV increases from
0 to 0.29, as products become more homogeneous (γ → 1), indicating that the
ﬁercer the competition becomes, the higher the spillovers that ﬁrms must in-
ternalize in order the RJV to be investment enhancing. According to upstream
proﬁts, as marginal cost and the price of the ﬁnal-good decrease, the demand
of the ﬁnal-good increases. Subsequently, the demand for inputs increases, sup-
pliers increase the input price that they charge and their proﬁts increase too.
3.2 The case of a Single Supplier
Let us now examine the case where ﬁnal-good producers face a single supplier
(S). In the last stage of the game they compete in quantities trying to maximize
their proﬁts:









(a − c)(2− γ)+( γ − 2)w + yi (2 − γδ)+yj (2δ − γ)
4 − γ2 (18)












[2(a − c)+( yi + yj)(1+δ)] (20)
Input price increases in ﬁrm i’s and ﬁrm j’s R&D investments, due to the
R&D spillover eﬀects.
13The same critical spillover rate holds for input price, upstream proﬁts and ﬁnal-good
quantities.
10In the second stage of the game, downstream ﬁrms set simultaneously their













Solving eq. (21), the optimal non-cooperative R&D investment level for ﬁrm
i is given by:
yS∗
inc =
(−6 − γ +2 δ +3 γδ)(a − c)
A3
(22)
where A3 =8 γ2 +4γ3 −2
¡




15 + 2δ +3 δ
2¢
.S u b s e q u e n t l y ,
equilibrium outcomes are given by:
Y S
nc =























2 (γ +2 )




Qualitative analysis for the role of γ and δ reveals that the results obtained in
the case of non-cooperative R&D, under competing vertical chains, hold under
a single supplier as well.
We now solve for the case where downstream ﬁrms form a RJV while facing a
single supplier (S). Output in the last stage is given by eq. (18) and in the third
stage the single supplier charges an input price given by eq. (20). Downstream



















The optimal ﬁrm i’s R&D investment in case of a RJV is:
yS∗
ic =
(4 + 2γ)(a − c)
7+8 γ +2 γ2 − 2δ − δ
2 (28)
11Setting A4 =7+8 γ +2 γ2 − 2δ − δ



























The eﬀects of γ and δ on equilibrium outcomes reached for the case of RJV



















¯ ¯ ¯ always hold. Investigating downstream
ﬁrms’ incentives to form a RJV (IS = ΠS
ic−ΠS
inc) when facing a single supplier,
we state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (i)Downstream ﬁrms have incentives to form a RJV under a
single supplier. (ii) R&D investments, input price, upstream proﬁts and ﬁnal-
good quantities are higher under a RJV, if δ>b δS (γ) with
db δS(γ)
dγ > 0 and
b δS (0.33) = 0 (b δS (1) = 0.72).
The intuition behind these results goes precisely as in the case of compet-
ing vertical chains and the results for investments are presented in ﬁgure 1b.
However, a novel argument is that the critical spillover rate δS(γ) is higher
than δCV(γ) for every degree of product diﬀerentiation, with δS(γ) increasing
from 0.33 to 0.72,a sγ → 1. The reason for that lays on the comparative
shift of investments and the subsequent point of intersection of the R&D in-
vestment curves. If ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively, as spillovers increase and
the free-riding eﬀect becomes stronger, the decreasing rate of investment in













. Thus, R&D investments in case of a single supplier
are more steep in δ than investments under competing vertical chains. On the
contrary, under a RJV, as spillovers increase, the increasing rate of investment













. Thus, the point of intersection between yCV
inc and yCV
ic
lays on the left of the point of intersection between yS
inc and yS
ic.
The analysis reveals that a single supplier increases the minimum spillovers
that must be internalized in order the RJV to enhance investments and ﬁnal-
good quantity. Therefore, we argue that a single supplier hinders the transfer
of the eﬃciency created by a RJV to consumers.
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. 2b: R&D investments under a











3.3 Comparing ﬁrms’ incentives to form a Research Joint
Venture
T h ep r e v i o u sa n a l y s i ss u g g e s t st h a tﬁnal-good producers do have incentives to
form a RJV in case of competing vertical chains and under a single supplier
too. In order to examine how does the structure of the input market aﬀect
downstreams’ incentives to form a RJV, we compare the magnitude of the in-
centives under competing vertical chains
¡
ICV¢
with the corresponding in case
of a single supplier
¡
IS¢
. We state the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Downstream ﬁrms incentives to form a Research Joint Venture
are stronger under a single supplier compared with incentives under competing
vertical chains, if δ<b δ (γ) with db δ
dγ > 0, b δ(0) = 0.24 and b δ (1) = 0.55.
Results are presented in ﬁgure 2. Interestingly, it is found that although a
R J Vi sa l w a y sp r o ﬁtable for downstream ﬁrms, their incentives to form a RJV
are non-monotone in the structure of the input market. The intuition behind
this result goes as follows: A RJV is always proﬁt-enhancing for downstream
ﬁrms. However, whether the input supplier(s) extract(s) part of the increased
downstream ﬁrms’ proﬁts due to the RJV, depends on the structure of the
input market, the degree of spillovers that are internalized under the RJV and
t h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation.
Assume ﬁrst that products are perfect substitutes (γ =1 ) . Whenever inter-
nalized spillovers are low (δ<0.55), the RJV increases downstreams’ proﬁts.
In case of a duopolistic input market, in order upstreams’ proﬁts to increase,
the magnitude of the internalized spillovers must be δ>0.29. Only in this case,
part of the eﬃciency created by the RJV is captured by the input suppliers. In
case of a monopolistic input market, the RJV never increases the single sup-
plier’s proﬁts. The eﬃciency of the RJV is fully exploited by the downstream
13 
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ﬁrms and no eﬃciency is transferred to the monopolistic input supplier. As a
result, if internalized spillovers are low, downstreams’ incentives to form a RJV
are stronger compared with the incentives under a duopolistic input market ¡
IS >I CV¢
.
Assume now that the magnitude of spillovers that are internalized under
the RJV is high (δ>0.55). In case of competing vertical chains, a RJV always
increases downstreams’ and input suppliers’ proﬁts, suggesting that part of the
RJV’s eﬃciency is exploited by the input suppliers. In contrast to that, under
a monopolistic upstream market, the supplier exploits higher proﬁts only if the
magnitude of the internalized spillovers is δ>0.72. But, as far as the proﬁts
that the monopolistic supplier captures are higher than the proﬁts that each
supplier in competing vertical chains does, downstreams’ incentives to form a
RJV are weakened, with ICV >I S.
Incorporating the product diﬀerentiation parameter and assuming that prod-
ucts can not be perfect substitutes, that is γ ∈ [0,1), we state the following re-
sult: In order the downstream ﬁrms’ incentives for a RJV under a single supplier
to be stronger than incentives under a duopolistic input market, the minimum
internalized spillovers under the RJV should increase the more homogeneous the
products become, that is γ → 1. This result suggests that the more homoge-
neous the products are, the more ﬁerce the competition between the ﬁnal-good
producers’ becomes and subsequently, the higher the spillovers that must be
internalized under the RJV in order incentives under a single supplier to be
stronger than incentives under a duopolistic input market. Observe in ﬁgure 2
that db δ
dγ > 0,with b δ(0) = 0.24 and b δ (1) = 0.55.
144 Investments in R&D
In this part of the paper, the attention isr e s t r i c t e do nt h ea m o u n t si n v e s t e d
in R&D. We examine how the coexistence of upstream rent-extracting and
spillovers of R&D activities aﬀects investments under diﬀerent vertical rela-
tions regimes, in case of non-cooperative and cooperative R&D. The present
paper is among the ﬁrst in the theoretical R&D literature that incorporates
R&D spillovers into a vertical setting.
4.1 The case of non-cooperation
Let us begin the analysis with the case of non-cooperative R&D investments.
Total R&D investment under competing vertical chains is given by eq. (7), and
the corresponding under a single supplier is given by eq. (23). Comparing these,
we state the following proposition:
Proposition 4 R&D investments are higher under a single supplier, compared
with the corresponding under competing vertical chains, if δ<b δ(γ) with db δ
dγ < 0,
b δ (0) = 1 and b δ(1) = 0.55.
This result contradicts with the conventional argument which predicts that
investments under a single supplier should be lower, as far as a single sup-
plier extracts higher rents. The intuition behind the result goes as follows:
When downstream ﬁrms invest in R&D non-cooperatively, investments depend
on the free-riding eﬀect and the supplier rent-extracting eﬀect.I n c a s e o f n o
free-riding (δ =0 ) , investments under a single supplier are higher than invest-







, its comparative stronger pres-
sure increases R&D investments, rather than to decrease them. As free-riding
arises, (δ>0),o n l yi fi ti sw e a k(δ<δ
∗) the single supplier pressure’s eﬀect
overcomes the negative eﬀect of free-riding and thus Y s >Ycv.W ea r g u et h a t
when competition is ﬁerce, in terms that downstream ﬁrms behave strategically
in both R&D and output stages, the stronger single supplier’s pressure increases
R&D investments, if free-riding is weak. It is the combination of low spillovers,
that favor, and single supplier’s strong pressure, that forces, downstream ﬁrms
to increase R&D investments.
Observe in ﬁgure 3a the inverse relation between the critical spillover rate
δ
∗ and the degree of product diﬀerentiation. The more unrelated the products
are, that is γ → 0, the higher the proﬁts that downstream ﬁrms capture and
subsequently, the negative eﬀect of free-riding must be very intense (high values
of δ)t oo ﬀset the single supplier’s stronger pressure. In case of unrelated goods
(γ =0 )free-riding has no eﬀect and Y s >Ycv, while in case of homogeneous
goods (γ =1 ) ,d o w n s t r e a mﬁrms invest more when facing a single supplier only
if δ
∗ < 0.55.
Note also that ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are higher under competing vertical chains,
compared with the case of a single supplier, unless γ =0and δ>0.2 (ﬁgure
15 
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3b). In addition to that, a single supplier’s proﬁts are always higher than
each supplier’s under competing vertical chains. Intuitively, downstream ﬁrms
invest in R&D and as a result the marginal cost falls. The price of the ﬁnal-
good decreases and its demand increases. Demand for input increases too and
supplier(s) extract(s) rents through setting higher input price. A single supplier





inc always hold). But, the higher the price that
suppliers charge, the lower the input quantities that downstream ﬁrms buy and
the lower their proﬁts. This is the rational why downstream ﬁrms’ proﬁts are






.H o w e v e r , f o r γ =0and
δ>0.2, each downstream earns more when facing a single supplier, which is a
counterintuitive result. In case of no free-riding, downstreams earn more under
competing vertical chains, regardless the degree of product diﬀerentiation. As
free-riding arises (δ>0.2), only if ﬁnal-goods are unrelated and subsequently
downstream ﬁrms act as monopolists, their proﬁts are higher when facing a
single supplier.
4.2 The case of a Research Joint Venture
Let us now proceed in the analysis of the case where ﬁrms invest in R&D under
a RJV. Investments under competing vertical chains are given by eq. (13) and
the corresponding under a single supplier are given by eq. (29). Comparing
these results, we state the following proposition:
Proposition 5 R&D investments are always higher in case of competing ver-
tical chains.
In case of a RJV, downstream ﬁrms invest cooperatively, they internalize
spillovers and avoid the free-riding. In this case, there is no strategic interac-














.14 T h ep r e v i o u sa n a l y s i ss u g g e s t st h a t
the eﬀect of the input market structure on R&D investments depends on whether
spillovers lead to free-riding or being internalized.
According to upstream and downstream proﬁts, the ﬁndings for the case
of RJV coincide with the corresponding in case of non-cooperation. However,
in the present case, downstreams’ proﬁts are always higher under competing
vertical chains. This result comes also from the fact that as far as spillovers are
being internalized, they do not aﬀect downsteams’ strategic interactions.
5W e l f a r e a n a l y s i s
In this section we conduct a welfare analysis and suggest some policy implica-
tions. For the purposes of the analysis we assume that there exists a regulator
who can approve the formation of a RJV if it enhances social welfare. The
appropriate measure of welfare consists of three parts: Consumers’ surplus,
downstream ﬁrms’ proﬁts and suppliers’ proﬁt s . W eh a v et w oa l t e r n a t i v eo r -
ganizational forms of R&D activities (non-cooperative: nc and cooperative: c)
and two downstreams-supplier(s) regimes: Single supplier (S) and competing


















¢2 indicates consumers’ surplus and 2ΠB
A and 2πB
A indicate overall down-
stream and upstream proﬁts respectively. Social welfare for each case is given
in the Appendix.
Interestingly, it is found that SWCV
nc >S W S
nc and SWCV
c >S W S
c always
hold. Downstream proﬁts and consumers’ surplus are higher under the CV
regime. On the contrary, a single supplier always earns more than each supplier
does under competing vertical chains. However, the sum of downstream prof-
its and consumers’ surplus overcome the single supplier’s depression in social
welfare.
We now turn to the core issue of the social welfare analysis: How does the
structure of the input market aﬀect the regulator’s decision to approve the RJV?
14Banerjee and Lin (2003), following a setup where n ﬁnal-good producers, that face a
monopolistic upstream supplier setting the input price, undertake cost-reducing R&D invest-
ments, prove that downstream ﬁrms may overcome underinvestment through a ﬁxed input
price contract, signed before R&D is undertaken. They also suggest that this type of arrange-
ment can be viewed as a long-term contractual relationship where the upstream ﬁrm commits
to a prespeciﬁed input price even if the demand conditions for the input change in the future.
We depart from their paper as we examine the case of a duopolistic input market as well and
we incorporate R&D spillovers. In addittion to that, the reversal of timing that they suggest
does not correspond to the planning horizon usually associated with the respective decisions,
as investment decisions are mostly long-run while input price contracts are usually negotiated
f o ram u c hs h o r t e rt i m eh o r i z o n .
17 














δ δ  
γ γ  CV
c SW
CV













nc SW c SW >
S  
4a 4b 











. 4b: Social welfare under a











In order to answer this question, we compare -for every regime-s o c i a lw e l f a r e
under non-cooperative R&D investments with welfare under a RJV, and we
state the following proposition:
Proposition 6 (i) The regulator will approve the Research Joint Venture un-
der the competing vertical chains regime if δ>b δCV (γ) with
db δCV (γ)
dγ > 0 and
b δCV (0) = 0 (b δCV (1) = 0.29). (ii) The regulator will approve the Research
Joint Venture under the single supplier regime if δ>b δS (γ) with
db δS(γ)
dγ > 0 and
b δS (0.33) = 0 (b δS (1) = 0.72).
Results are presented in ﬁgures 4a and 4b. According to the economic ratio-
nale behind these results, a RJV always leads to increased downstream proﬁts.
However, the minimum internalized spillovers in order the RJV to increase con-
sumers’ surplus and suppliers’ proﬁts are lower under the competing vertical
chains regime, for every degree of product diﬀerentiation, as we have already
proven in section 3. In case of competing vertical chains, the minimum spillover
rate increases from 0 to 0.29, as products become more homogeneous, while
in case of a single supplier the corresponding rate increases from 0.33 to 0.72.
Thus, although a RJV always increases downstream proﬁts, it is not always
preferable from the social welfare point of view. The more concentrated the
input market is, the higher the spillovers that have to be internalized through
a RJV, in order downstream ﬁrms’ and regulator’s incentives for a RJV to be
aligned. This result underlines the diﬃculties for the alignment between ﬁrms’
and regulators’ preferences and the rigidities for the transfer of the eﬃciency
created by a RJV to consumers, that a single supplier causes.
In the relevant literature, although Ishii (2004) conducts a welfare analysis
he does not suggest any policy implications for reaching socially preferable out-
comes. On the contrary, the previous analysis oﬀers some directions for R&D
18and antitrust policy implications. According to the ﬁrst one, policy-makers
should move towards the encouragement of RJVs (e.g. through subsidization)
in R&D intensive industries where input suppliers do have market power. A
RJV leads to more preferable outcomes for ﬁrms and consumers given that a
minimum degree of spillovers are internalized. The second policy implication
comes from the depressing eﬀects of a single supplier on social welfare. We
suggest that policy-makers should extend the antitrust rules to input markets
of R&D intensive ﬁnal-good industries. Thus, possible anticompetitive situa-
tions should be investigated in the suppliers’ market, beyond the market of the
ﬁnal-good.
Existing literature on RJVs, assuming perfectly competitive input markets,
suggests that if spillovers exceed a critical level, a RJV results in enhanced social
welfare and thus, the cooperation should be approved by the regulator. This
paper contributes to the relevant literature as we prove that the regulator, when
deciding to approve or not the formation of a RJV, should also take into account
the structure of the input market. The analysis shows that it is the combina-
tion of the above R&D and antitrust policies that leads to the more preferable
outcomes in terms of social welfare. Through the above integrated policy-mix,
policy-makers can overturn not only free-riding (through the encouragement
of RJVs), but also rent-extracting (through blocking high concentration in in-
put suppliers for R&D intensive ﬁnal-good industries), and this is not only an
contributional argument in the relevant literature, but also a straightforward
applicable policy. Especially for the case of European Union, given the wide
asymmetries across Member States’ innovation policies, our analysis suggests
that the above policy-mix can be an eﬀective framework for integrated policies
that will suﬃciently increase European competitiveness.
6E x t e n s i o n s
The basic model is rather stylized, so it is natural to check the robustness of
our results. Thus, we extend the basic model in three diﬀerent directions.15
6.1 Bertrand competition
The question addressed in this subsection is whether results demonstrated under
Cournot competition, hold under price competition as well. The corresponding
proﬁt function for downstream ﬁrm i, has the form:16
Πi (Pi,P j,w i,y i,y j,δ,θ)=[ Pi− (wi + c − yi − δyj)] ×
α(1 − γ)+γPj − Pi





15Due to space limits, the results are presented in brief. A detailed derivation of the results
is available from the authors upon request.
16As in the case of Cournot competition, we set k =1a condition which guarantees that
the second order conditions are satisﬁed.
19It can be shown that results obtained in the previous sections, hold for the
case of Bertrand competition as well. The reason is that although the nature of
product market competition is altered, competition in prices does not alter the
interactions between downstream ﬁrms and supplier(s) that drive the results.
6.2 Bargaining over input price
In the previous analysis, it was assumed that supplier(s) unilaterally set(s) the
input price. It is then natural to check whether our results still hold if we allow
downstream ﬁrms to have bargaining power over the input price. It has already
been showed that results obtained under Cournot competition hold for the case
of Bertrand competition as well and that although the product diﬀerentiation γ
aﬀects the results, it is not the main factor that drives them. Therefore, we allow
for bargaining over the input price, considering homogeneous products (γ =1 )
and Cournot competition. In the case of competing vertical chains, under the
general asymmetric Nash Bargain over input price between each input supplier
-d o w n s t r e a mﬁrm pair i solves:









We consider that input suppliers are endowed with the same bargaining
power (β1 = β2 = βCV). It is found that downstream ﬁrms do have incentives
to form a RJV even if the input price is determined through bargaining. In
addition to that, the critical spillover rate that guarantees investments, input
price, upstream proﬁts and ﬁnal-good quantity enhancement due too the RJV,






the second case, a single supplier (with bargaining power βS), bargains with
downstream ﬁrms’ federation over the input price and the federation acts so as to
maximize overall industry’s proﬁts. We also ﬁnd that downstream ﬁrms do have
incentives for a RJV. Interestingly, the critical spillover rate that guarantees
investments, input price, upstream proﬁts and ﬁnal-good quantity enhancement





It turns out that our qualitative results are robust. Thus, it is mainly the
structure of the input market rather than the distribution of bargaining power
between upstream(s) and downstreams that drives the results. The trade-oﬀ be-
tween suppliers’ bargaining power and the critical spillover rate, depends on the
regime between supplier(s) ﬁnal-good producers. The economic rationale be-
hind this result is that the distribution of bargaining power, between ﬁnal-good
producers and input suppliers, aﬀects suppliers’ rent-extracting potential and
17The case of bargaining in competing vertical chains was analytically solved, while results
for the case of bargaining between a single supplier and the federation were obtained after
numerical simulations. A detailed ﬁle is available from the authors upon request.
18In all of the above cases, the fall-back payoﬀs for downstream ﬁrms and input suppliers
are zero.
20downstream R&D investments as spillovers vary and subsequently, the critical
spillover rate is also inﬂuenced.
6.3 The case of a RJV cartel
Our formal modeling for the case of the RJV was based on two key assumptions:
A c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁrst one, the magnitude of spillovers is industry-wide and the
sharing of information in case of a RJV remains the same as when R&D is
conducted non-cooperatively. According to the second one, when ﬁrms form a
RJV, R&D activities are conducted in two diﬀerent labs. Thus, although free-
riding is avoided, ﬁrms do not eliminate the duplication of eﬀort. It is logical
then to examine the case where ﬁrms form a RJV and undertake their R&D
activities in one common lab. In this case, information sharing is maximized,
that is, the formation of the RJV leads to δ =1 . T h i si st h ec a s eo faRJV
cartel, in the taxonomy proposed by Kamien et al. (1992), where ﬁrms avoid
not only the free-riding but the duplication of eﬀort as well.
Analysis of pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria discloses that a
RJV cartel gives more preferable results, in terms of investment levels, ﬁnal-
good quantity, input price, consumers’ surplus and social welfare. However,
downstream ﬁrms’ incentives to form a RJV cartel are always stronger under
the competing vertical chains regime, compared with incentives in case of a
single supplier.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Although the research on RJVs is growing, formal models have focused on hor-
izontal settings. However, vertical market structures are critical because they
may hinder downstream R&D investments. The purpose of this paper was to
investigate ﬁnal-good producers’ incentives to form a RJV and R&D invest-
ments in vertically related industries where input suppliers extract rents. The
analysis suggests that downstream ﬁrms’ incentives to form a RJV are non-
monotone in the structure of the input market. Although a RJV is always
proﬁt-enhancing for downstream ﬁrms, whether the input supplier(s) extract
rents from the downstream ﬁrms depends on the structure of the input market,
the degree of spillovers that are internalized under the RJV and the degree of
product diﬀerentiation. In addition to that, it was showed that the intense hold-
up of a single supplier, in case of non-cooperative R&D, increases investments
if free-riding is weak. The welfare analysis suggests that the regulator, when
deciding to approve or not the formation of a RJV, should take into account
the structure of the input market and the regime that relates input suppliers
with ﬁnal-good producers. We suggest that the encouragement of RJVs between
downstream ﬁrms jointly with the strict antitrust in input market leads to the
more preferable outcomes in terms of social welfare.
The results obtained in this paper could guide future research in the ﬁeld
of empirical investigation of RJVs participation determinants and participants’
21performance. An empirical test should start with a detailed study for the dis-
crimination in the data material between process R&D intensive industries with
low and high concentration of input suppliers. Based on the previous analysis,
a ﬁrst testable hypothesis is the participation probability of ﬁnal-good produc-
ers in RJVs depending on the concentration ratio in input suppliers’ industries.
In ﬁnal-good industries with low spillovers, the higher the concentration in in-
put suppliers’ industries, the higher the probability of ﬁnal-good producers’
participation in RJVs. Empirical results consistent with our argument would
indicate that ﬁrms participate in RJVs in order to overcome their suppliers’
rent-extracting.
8A p p e n d i x
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